Who Still Holds the Keys? A Director’s Review of Shared Logins and Approval Rights
Photo: Scottish Government, OGL 3, via Wikimedia Commons
In many UK owner-managed companies, access has grown by habit rather than design. A director holds the bank token because they always have. The office manager knows the payroll password because it was needed one Friday. A former employee’s mailbox remains live because nobody wanted to lose the history. None of this feels like a crisis until an invoice is redirected, a laptop is lost, or an insurer asks who could approve a payment.
The point of an access audit is not to turn a director into an IT specialist. It is to restore a simple principle: the right people should have the right access, for the right reasons, and there should be a record showing that this was considered. For a company where trust has long substituted for process, that can be a revealing exercise.
Begin with the accounts that can move money
Banking should be the first stop. List every person who can view balances, set up a payee, approve a payment or amend user permissions. Check whether the company still relies on a single approver, a shared token or a password held in a desk drawer. Confirm whether payee changes require a second person and whether that second person is genuinely independent.
Invoice fraud often succeeds because the controls look adequate on paper but collapse in practice. A supplier email is compromised, new bank details arrive, and one person has both the authority and the habit of acting quickly. A short written approval matrix is more useful than a broad policy. It should state who may request a payment, who may approve it, who may release it and what happens when those roles overlap.
Map the cloud cupboard, not just the bank account
Email, file storage, accounting software and customer databases are where company information actually sits. Identify the administrator accounts for each service. Find out who owns the billing relationship and who can add or remove users. Look for shared mailboxes that are used as login identities rather than as communication tools. Review integrations that were added for a project and never removed.
Generic accounts are a particular weak point. An address such as admin@ or accounts@ may be convenient, but it obscures who is acting. Where shared access is unavoidable, it should be limited, monitored and supported by multi-factor authentication. Where it is simply a habit, replace it with named accounts and least-privilege permissions. Most staff do not need access to every folder, every report or every setting.
Multi-factor authentication should be treated as a baseline control for email, banking, payroll and any system holding personal data. It is not a technical luxury. It is the difference between a stolen password and a stolen company.
Follow the people, including the ones who have left
An access audit is also a people review. Take the staff list and the contractor list and compare them with the user lists in each system. Former employees are the most common source of stale permissions. Check email forwarding rules, payroll access, pension provider portals, mobile devices and any remote-access tools. Confirm that hardware has been returned and that shared passwords known to leavers have been changed.
Joiners and movers matter as much as leavers. A person who changes role often retains the access attached to their previous position. A temporary contractor may be given permanent permissions because it was quicker than designing a limited account. A one-page checklist for joiners, movers and leavers is a practical control, provided someone owns it and can show it was used.
Use one day to produce evidence
A workable audit can be completed in a single day if it is scoped tightly. In the morning, gather the facts: bank mandates, administrator lists, payroll users, cloud account owners and a current staff list. In the afternoon, fix the obvious issues and record the remaining actions. The output should be a short access register, not a technical report. It should name the system, the account owner, who has administrative rights, whether multi-factor authentication is active and when the position was last reviewed.
That record matters for more than internal discipline. UK GDPR expects personal data to be handled with appropriate security, and accountability is easier to demonstrate when access decisions are documented. Cyber-insurance questionnaires now ask similar questions about privileged accounts, multi-factor authentication and leaver processes. A company that cannot answer them promptly may find cover more expensive, more conditional or harder to obtain.
Fixes that withstand scrutiny
Start with the controls that reduce the most risk for the least effort. Remove shared logins where named accounts are possible. Apply multi-factor authentication to email, banking and payroll. Reduce administrator rights to the people who genuinely need them. Require dual approval for bank detail changes and large payments. Suspend accounts on the day a person leaves, not at the end of the month.
Then set a review rhythm. A quarterly check of administrator accounts, bank approvers and payroll users is usually enough for a small company. The director who signs off the review should be able to explain the exceptions, not simply collect signatures. Where an exception is accepted, record why and when it will be revisited.
The objective is not a perfect security posture. It is a company that knows who holds its keys, can show that access is deliberate, and can close a door quickly when someone leaves. For an owner-managed business, that is a modest investment with a direct bearing on cash, data and reputation.